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ROY RAY LECTURE*
THE DECISIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN TORTS
CONTROVERSIES
WEX S. MALONE**

When Professor Kennedy honored me with an invitation to
deliver the Roy Ray Lecture today, he gave me only one clue
as to what was expected. He told me that Roy Ray himself hoped
that the talk would be so pitched as to be interesting to first-year
law students. He didn't mention anything about subject matter,
and I suspect that this is because he probably already had been
alerted that I make no claim to have a wide or comprehensive
range of interests in the world of law. For forty years I have been
a torts teacher and everything I have done has been in this area.
For me, torts has been great fun. What a wide cross-section of
life it covers! It ranges from bar room fights, automobile accidents,
stubbing one's toes in a dark theatre, a manufacturer turning out
50,000 dangerously defective automobiles, a surgeon performing
an operation on the wrong patient, to a securities analyst who
has told lies during the conduct of some business transaction with
a customer. I feel that torts is as big and as human as life itself,
and if a person doesn't like torts, he probably doesn't like living
very much.
So it's going to be torts again today. I gather that those of you
who are first-year students have had about six months of torts, and
if your experience has been similar to my own as a first-year law
* The Roy Ray Lecture is an annual address delivered at Southern Methodist
University, School of Law, by a distinguished member of the legal community.
The address is sponsored by Southern Methodist University Professor Emeritus of
Law, Roy Ray.
** Wex S. Malone is Boyd Professor Emeritus at Louisiana State University. He was an Advisor to the Reporter for the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Torts. Additionally, Professor Malone is the author of
the recently published work TORTS IN A NUTSHELL-INJURIES TO RELATIONS.
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student, you probably have been so busy trying to keep your nose
above water in an effort to find out what torts is, so busy trying to
get your fill of its rules and doctrines, its procedures and res ipsa
loquiturs, that you have had very little chance to sit down and
wonder how torts got to be that way. This is what I would like
to talk to you about this morning. What is torts law trying to do?
What makes it tick?
Even as I start, you are probably asking, and justifiably, how
did torts get to be what way? What way is it? When I entered
the study of law back in the late twenties, I was taught that torts
was a scheme for imposing liability for damages upon one who
injured another through his fault. Without a showing of fault,
there should be no liability, we were told. Well, we took this very
seriously and when we finally ran into absolute or unqualified
liability, in cases such as Rylands v. Fletcher,' and in the cases
dealing with fire and trespassing animals, we tended to shove
these situations aside as being something exceptional, to be accounted for only as freaks of history. Similarly, workman's compensation, which put a part of the costs of the employee's injuries
on the shoulders of the blameless employer, was to be sharply
distinguished by us from familiar tort liability, for the reason
that under compensation law fault was ignored.
The fault system, however, already was deteriorating at that
time, and since then it has continued to deteriorate at an accelerating pace. Liability imposed on non-negligent manufacturers for
injuries from the use of products that turned out fortuitously to be
defective has become a common-place feature of your torts study
today. And you have doubtless devoted considerable attention to
the legislative movements in recent years toward no-fault motor
vehicle liability.
We are clearly losing faith in the traditional idea that ordinarily, losses should lie where they fall-that is to say, on the
shoulders of the victim. We are now more hesitant to accept
as an unqualified proposition that a shifting of liability to the
shoulders of another person cannot be justified except when it
came to be shown that the other person was a wrongdoer who
will be taught a wholesome lesson when he finds himself socked
1L.R.

3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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with a bill for damages. The relevancy of this traditional view has
become doubtful with the passage of time and the changes that
are taking place in our economy and society. Today liability insurance readily can be made available to relieve any wrongdoer
from paying the cost for his sins; or, frequently, the defendant is
a large enterprise which can pass the accident costs on to the
public as an increased charge for its goods or its services. This,
of course, has tended to knock the props out from under the
principle of liability dependent upon fault.
I certainly do not intend, however, to leave you with an impression that blameworthiness has no role to play in torts law
today. Quite to the contrary, ethical ideals of right and wrong
and notions of socially acceptable versus unacceptable behavior
do exert tremendous influence on the outcome of any torts controversy. I hope to make but one point-fault, as I see it, does not
and cannot serve as the exclusive basis upon which our tort system must rest. The word "fault" will remain prominent in our
torts vocabulary so long as we continue to feel that good guys
should win out over bad guys. But let us remember that moral
blameworthiness is only one factor, and the role it plays is in hot
competition with a number of other factors operating in the arena
of litigation. Let me mention just a few of these. There is the
competing idea that accident loss should be shouldered initially by
the person who is in the best position to spread the cost along
in diluted form among those who enjoy the benefit of the activity
that was being pursuaded when the harm was inflicted. We are inclined to feel that when we charge each member of society just a
little bit no one really gets hurt. This, of course, is familiar to
you. Also, our Judeo-Christian ethics persuade us to favor the
weak and the humble in their struggle against the rich and powerful. There is a sporting instinct frequently at work in the process
of litigation. There is the notion that accident costs should be
placed upon the shoulders of the person or the organization who
is in the better position to avoid the same or similar accidents in
the future. And there are many additional forces that are likely to
play a part.
Are we not, therefore, tempted to conclude that the impulse
that makes torts law tick is merely a reaction of a human being
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to all these warring impulses and that there is no one controlling
basis for liability? Are not these conflicting impulses all dumped
into a bag, and the judge, jury or other trier selects as controlling
that impulse which happens to appeal to him or to them most
strongly for the case at hand? We may be tempted to conclude
that in the final analysis what controls is the uninhibited personality
of whichever judge or jury happens to be sitting on the case.
Thus we wind up with a sort of "gut-reaction" theory which must
explain what lies at the basis of torts law.
I know you are not going to let me slip you this kind of intellectual "Mickey Finn." Despite the fact that each of these
factors just mentioned can exert a potential influence in the
resolution of a torts controversy, there is much more to the show
than this. For we know that there is a very substantial measure
of order in torts law and that, more often than not, a knowledgeable person can make a dependable, intelligent prediction on the
outcome of torts litigation.
If these various policy considerations we have discovered are
at war with each other within the conscience of the trier, the
struggle is by no means a free-for-all with no holds barred. The
competing policy factors must fight it out on a stage that has been
arranged elaborately for the struggle, and the fight must be conducted in accordance with certain Marquis of Queensbury Rules
which have been worked out over the years. This stage on which
the battle must be conducted and the rules of order that must be
devised to control the combat make up together what I call the
"decisional environment." It is the nature of this environment that
I would like for us to consider. Without it litigation would be a
farce. The effort to resolve a dispute through law is distinguishable
from the resolution of a dispute in everyday life by virtue of the
need in the courtroom to accommodate the decisional environment.
The element of rules which we loosely call "the law" owes its
justification to the needs of the decisional environment. Yet this
environment, as I conceive it, is sweeping in its extension. It goes
far beyond what we call substantive rules and principles. It embraces all congeries of procedural and evidentiary devices which
loom with such importance in the conduct of litigation. Furthermore, the litigation environment includes what might be called
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traditionally accepted patterns of thinking of judges and lawyers;
the inhibitions, if you will, which are constantly at work in the
mind of the trier.
Certainly the term "decisional environment" must embrace the
arena within which the struggle between the warring policy factors takes place; that is, the trial forum itself. I suggest that we
begin our discussion here. There first must be established the
proper role to be played by the referees who, when the battle is
over, must determine the outcome. In our Anglo-American system, there are both a judge and a jury to serve as referees. Let us
look first at the judge.
He is the professional man who must view the fight within a
time oriented perspective. He must determine whether a conclusion
he is urged by one of the combatants to reach is consistent with
conclusions that have been reached in the past by other referees
in similar struggles. Then he must ask whether the conclusion
urged upon him is one that threatens to cause troubles in future
decisions for those referees who will follow him. Furthermore, he
must do more than merely satisfy his own professional conscience
on these matters. It will be borne in mind that a salient characteristic of the litigation environment is the requirement that the
judge so explain the doctrine he has created as to convince a
critical profession both that the decision enjoys an acceptable
consistency with past decisions and that it will lead to a minimum
of turmoil for future decisions in analogous cases. He affords
this explanation by resort to an opinion in which he brings into
play those theories, principles, doctrines and rules that you have
been learning in your study of torts. He may end up with a conclusion which would be wholly commendable when applied to the
particular facts before him. Yet in announcing this decision,
however, the judge may adopt an explanation that leads to serious
future complications. Let us assume that a passerby happens to
see an infant drowning in a shallow pool and that he fails to do
anything about it. Consequently the child dies and the parents
bring suit. Under these facts a judge's conclusion that liability
should be imposed and damages assessed is one that would strike
most decent people as being eminently proper. If he adds by
way of explanation, however, that there exists some general duty
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to render needed assistance whenever this reasonably can be done
he may lead later tribunals into serious trouble. He, unfortunately,
has chosen a formula that cannot be administered successfully in
future controversies with new facts. Roscoe Pound has pointed
out that there is a marked difference between an engineering
formula and a legal formula. An engineer who is designing a
bridge can work out the stresses and loads which must be anticipated and then can calculate the weight-bearing capacities that
will be required to accommodate that load. After he has done
this, he is fortunately in a position to make provisions for an increase in the capacities so that they can bear more stress and
strain than he anticipates they will be called upon to bear. Thus
there is a blessed margin of tolerance which can serve as protection because it is not expected that the bridge-using public will
require that added protection. Unfortunately, however, this does
not hold true for a legal formula. Judges know full well that any
principle or formula they choose to announce in a decision is certain to be invoked later, and that it will be pressed to its utmost
limits by eager lawyers who hope to turn it to their advantage.
Hence there arises the necessity for conservative understatement
or even circuitous or fictionalized statement to satisfy the needs
of the decisional environment. Courts are obligated to protect their
own judicial machinery against the prospect of future imposition.
The decisional environment, when viewed in this light, becomes
something more than a passive stage upon which the act of judging is performed. It begins to operate as a factor just as active in
influencing the course of judgment as is the moral factor, the economic factor, the sportsmanship factor, or any of the other factors.
When the decisional environment is thus considered in terms of its
capacity to exert its own influence upon the judgment that is being
pronounced, it can be characterized appropriately as the "administrative factor," which must be reconciled along with the other factors that influence the decision.
When we discuss the refereeing function as a part of the decisional environment, we are talking about two referees: the judge
and the jury. We have seen that the decisional role of the judge
is that of the disciplined expert who is bound by professional
standards and who must discharge his function within a time-
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oriented framework looking to both the past and the future. This
makes for caution and reserve. Quite in contrast is the role to be
played by the twelve laymen who make up the jury. Their presence
on the decisional scene contemplates a judgment dictated largely
by instinct; a judgment tailored to meet the individual and the
unique picture at hand. There is little or no concern by the jury
for the ultimate societal effect its decision might have. It does
not divide the problem into rational fragments; it responds to the
totality of the situation before it. Its utility is impaired whenever
laymen are expected to behave like "little judges." The jury
reaches its conclusion without any explanation and it then is dissolved back into the society from which it came.
With two tribunals operating simultaneously on the decisional
scene, it is obvious that between the judge and the jury a determination must be made as to who is to decide what. The responsibility of apportioning the judgment-passing function is a matter
of the utmost importance to the law. The controversy must be
fragmented so that those portions of it that demand professional
expertise fall within the domain of the trained jurist, while those
areas of the dispute that lend themselves readily to intuitive layjudgment can be assigned to the jury. The task of apportionment
is one that is entrusted exclusively to the judge and herein lies
the genius of the common law that makes possible a working blend
of expertise and laymen's horse sense. The judge is furnished with
an elaborate arsenal of language which affords him a free hand
either to pass the resolution of the entire conflict to the laymen
or to retain the power of judgment exclusively within his own
control. Alternatively he may fragment the controversy into issues
and allocate to the jury only those which in his sound judgment
he feels the jurymen can handle competently, without imperiling
the future course of litigation. It is to this end that there have
come into being a myriad of devices such as the prima facie case,
the non-suit or directed verdict, the application of res ipsa loquitur,
the conception of negligence per se or negligence per quod. There
is a burden of persuasion and a burden of going forward. All
these and more constitute the elaborate intellectual machinery
that makes possible an intelligent apportionment of the task of
deciding.
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With these facts in mind, let us glance for a moment at the
basic organization of the formal law of torts. We recognize that
torts rules and doctrines fall within the domain of several distinct
networks. These are broad administrative areas. Intentional harms
to persons or property, for example, fall under one network
which contemplates a trial in two stages: a prima facie showing,
followed characteristically by a plea in confession and avoidance.
This structure embraces assaults, batteries, trespasses and the like.
Once the victim makes a satisfactory showing that he suffered
physical harm and that the harm was inflicted by the defendant,
he will be entitled to recovery if nothing else appears. If a conflict of interests is to be brought into focus in a controversy of
this kind, it is the defendant who must initiate the struggle between competing values by affirmatively asserting the purpose he
sought to achieve by delivering the blow crossing the forbidden
boundary. He will attempt to establish a privilege. It is important
for us to notice at this point that the controlling hand here is
that of the judge; a jury is not free to place a value on whatever
claim the defendant may choose to assert. If, for example, the
defendant seeks to avoid liability for a battery by showing that he
was attempting to make his way on an important mission and
that the plaintiff's presence served as a serious obstruction to
his passage, the judge, without hesitation, will deny him access
to a jury. If the jury were allowed to consider his plea, it might
feel free to decide that the mission on which the defendant had embarked was sufficiently important to justify his administering the
trivial push with which he was charged. The judge, however,
forestalls any such action by the jury and compels a decision
favorable to the plaintiff. The legal policy here has been predetermined by rules which dictate the judge's action, and he in
turn has exclusive power to control the outcome. The jury is
restricted to factual determinations; for example, "did the defendant hit the plaintiff?" and "how much damage should be
awarded?" If we move to another network, such as the negligence
network, we find that the jury's range of operations is far broader
than under the prima facie network we just considered. In most
instances of alleged negligence the lay jurymen will enjoy the
ultimate power of decision under a broad formula which was de-
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signed for jury usage, that of the reasonable man. Although the
judge will still retain supervisory control through the channel of
the non-suit or directed verdict, the decisional environment here
is such that the jury is hoisted fully into the saddle.
One might go so far as to venture that all torts law, without
exception, is designed to assist in affording an answer to one
single inquiry: Will society gain if the plaintiff's harm is repaired
through legal intervention? Or will the social gain be greater if
the law manifests its willingness to allow or even encourage the
defendant to do what he was doing when and where he was doing
it and in the manner in which it was being done? Perhaps we
can use the more homely phrase "is the game worth the candle?"
The differences between the various networks we have mentioned,
including the power of the judge and jury, are traditionally recognized means for making profound shifts in the litigation environment within which this basic inquiry must be answered.
We may now ask "Why is so much elaborate legal doctrine
dedicated to the mere task of implementing a selection of the
referee?" The observation has been made many times that it is
more important to determine who shall make the decision than to
determine what the decision shall be. The decision announced by
the judge, guided by precedent, reflects a deliberation that extends beyond the conflicting interests of the immediate parties.
The judicial decision is designed to reflect an overview of those
social, moral and economic values which through the course of
experience have earned our acceptance and respect.
The jury, on the other hand, tends to see chiefly the immediate
scene. During the past century, unrestrained human sympathy has
strongly worked in favor of the claimant, the hapless, helpless
neighbor struggling with an impersonal corporate entity with bottomless pockets. In participating as jurors, laymen often find an
outlet for their human resentment against an industrialized and
economically stratified society. In recent years, the pathos of this
appeal has been sharpened by an increasingly astute and skillful
plaintiff's bar. Whenever the accepted rules, doctrines and other
intellectual devices that serve to apportion the function of deciding are wielded in such a manner as to place increased power
within the hands of the jury, a significant step has been taken to-
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ward the imposition of absolute liability, though under the guise
of fault terminology. Thus negligence can be transformed into
unqualified liability by a mere shift in the decisional environment. In France, where this two-tribunal system does not exist so
that no such manipulation is possible, judges have been obliged
to make radical adjustments in the theology of their civil code
to weaken the impact of fault upon liability. In the common law
world, we can produce the same effect with a minimum of outright
doctrinal change. We merely loosen the reins and give the jury its
full head.
The range of devices available for augmenting the jury's power
in Anglo-American jurisprudence is indeed wide. Whenever a
duty, at one time sharply limited, is now deliberately broadened
in its scope the former power of the judge to control the course
of the decision through non-suit, directed verdict or the constraint
of instructions is lessened, and consequently the likelihood of
recovery is correspondingly increased.
Your torts casebook is filled with illustrations of this transformation. Several years ago, the California Supreme Court scuttled all the familiar limitations that formerly prevailed with reference to the duty of care owed by an occupier to trespassers and
licensees; and chose, instead, to recognize a broad duty of care
toward all persons entering upon property, regardless of their
status The court then announced that thereafter the standing of
the person entering, whether trespasser, licensee, or whatever,
was a matter to be taken into consideration only as it might
reflect on the extent of care demanded of the occupier.' By so
doing, the California Supreme Court denied the judiciary its
former power to control judgments. No longer could there be
resort to such court-manipulable devices as the attractive nuisance.
It obliterated a mass of earlier court-drawn distinctions between
anticipated entrants and unsuspected intruders, and it deliberately
chose to ignore the distinction between appreciated defects and
those defects which merely ought to be appreciated. The remaining question as to how much effect the lowly status of the plain"Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
3
Id. at 115, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
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tiff should have in fixing the extent of the occupier's duty was
dumped into the lap of the jury.
Of tremendous interest in connection with this growing tendency to transfer power to the jury is the recent emergence, through
both statute and decision, of comparative negligence. On the surface, it appears that this reform serves to enhance substantially
the importance of the role played by fault in accident cases. Under
comparative negligence, not only does the existence or nonexistence
of blameworthiness determine whether the defendant is or is not
to be held liable, but the concept of fault also is to be used as a
yardstick for measuring the amount of damage that should be
forthcoming. Is the running of a red light more blameworthy
than the act of exceeding the speed limit by ten miles per hour?
Is Milton a better poet than a pig is fat? The jury is entrusted
with the power to answer the unanswerable. Gone is the former
power of the court to non-suit the plaintiff as a matter of law
on the ground that he was contributorily negligent. Gone also is
the power of the judge to manipulate the intricate involutions of
the last clear chance doctrine.
The possibilities for working radical policy changes by merely
maneuvering the decisional environment are dramatically highlighted in a line of decisions of the United States Supreme Court
in which that court interpreted the Federal Employer's Liability
Act (FELA)" in such a way as to pass a virtually unfettered
power of judgment into the hands of the jury, a power which
resulted in a liability that is almost absolute. The Federal Employer's Liability Act, at the time of its inception in 1908, was
a modest congressional enactment designed only to extend to
railroad employees the same common law remedies for negligence
available to workers in other occupations at that time. Although
the federal measure went somewhat further and abolished the
defense of contributory negligence, the defense of assumption of
risk remained in the FELA until 1939.' During this early thirtyyear period the trial courts had seized upon the defense of assumed risk as a means of protecting the railroads from liability,
445 U.S.C. § 51-60 (1976)
ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65).
5

(originally enacted as Act of April 22, 1908,

Ch. 685, § 4, 53 Stat. 1404 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1976)).
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even in many instances where negligence could be established. In
each such instance, the procedure adopted was that of manipulating the decisional environment. The court readily acknowledged
that a jury should be allowed to render a verdict for the victim
if it appeared that he had not assumed the risk. However, if the
risk that brought about the accident in question was one that was
commonly discoverable in railroad operations in the vicinity, an
"ordinary" risk, the worker was deemed to have assumed it. By
making their own determinations as to what would amount to
ordinary risks, the courts were able to retain the power of judgment primarily in their own hands. Most railroad accidents happen in situations that fall readily into repetitious stereotyped patterns. These patterns, which the courts had encountered time after
time in the general course of railroad accident litigation, came
to be considered by the judges as instances of ordinary risk which
the employee assumed as a matter of law when he entered the
railroad employment. By this manipulation, the courts could put
an end to many controversies in a way that favored employers
before the jury could even have its turn at bat. In so doing, however, a court is not to be charged with trickery or chicanery. The
judge is responding to a traditional feeling prevalent in past years
that extravagant recoveries could only serve eventually to bankrupt the railroads upon which the continued growth and prosperity
of America was dependent. For half a century, the courts had
profoundly mistrusted juries who, they felt, were incapable of
appreciating the full range of values at stake in railroad accident
litigation. The courts were convinced that the jury's sympathies
were likely to dominate their deliberations. This was simply the
social and economic climate of the time.
We can now see what happens when the decisional environment
undergoes a change. During this same period, employees in other
enterprises who were injured in ordinary industrial employment
covered by workmen's compensation were faring better progressively. Compensation benefits were improving substantially. Despite
efforts made to induce Congress to adopt a compensation scheme
for railroads, the only statutory change that became effective in
the Federal Employers' Liability Act was the abolition of the defense of assumption of the risk. This, as we know, was done in
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1939. By this time, the temper of the Supreme Court had changed
substantially and the justices were indicating that they were prepared to move in the direction of no-fault liability that prevailed
in other work accident areas. They seized upon the advantage
brought about by Congress' abolition of assumption of the risk
and, in 1943, began with increasing eagerness to insist that the
claims of railroad workers reach the jury whenever there was the
slightest indication of employer negligence.' They announced confidently that when Congress abolished the defense of assumption
of the risk it intended to depart from the traditional principles of
negligence.! This passage of the power of judgment to the jury
was expanded to such an extent that by 1959 the opinions of
trial and appellate judges were filled with cries of despair. In
that year, a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan voiced the
following complaint. Speaking of the majority decision, he observed:
I fear that this decision confirms my growing suspicion that the
real but unarticulated meaning of Rogers' is that in FELA cases
anything that a jury says goes, with the consequence that all
meaningful judicial supervision over jury verdicts in such cases
has been put to an end .... If so, I think the time has come when
the court should frankly say so. If not, then the court should at
least give expression to the standards by which the lower courts
are to be guided in these cases.9
This is a truly challenging observation, and I would like to
leave with you this morning the question whether manipulation
of the decisional environment by courts to carry out basic changes
in policy is a wise practice. Ironically, judges are exercising their
own power for the purpose of defeating that same power. I believe I can see both advantages and disadvantages here. From
its inception, the common law torts system has managed to provide a rare blend of judicial expertise and lay opinion. A delicate
balance of power maintained between judge and jury serves to
reconcile certain sharp inconsistencies that characterize the pub'Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
7Id. at 58.
' Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
'Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 361 U.S. 15, 27 (1959) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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lic's expectations concerning our torts law. We demand that our
courts maintain a comforting appearance of stability-an assurance that we shall not be governed by whim or caprice. Yet at
the same time, we insist that the courts show themselves to be fully
responsive to changing needs. To satisfy these contradictory demands, a certain amount of judicial sleight of hand is inevitable.
Perhaps this is to be encouraged so long as the policy changes at
stake are modest. It is possible, however, that impending changes
now being made in substantive policy are too basic for an undercover operation. Perhaps we are approaching the point where the
stratagem and the false front involved are too expensive. It is
arguable that the public should be dealt with openly, that we
should be brought face to face with those radical transformations
that are now taking place in the administration of justice. How can
we determine whether we can afford the expense that is built into
our accident reparation system when the operations upon which
the system depends are hidden behind the artifices of the decisional environment? If it is to our advantage to live under some
sort of no-fault system, is it not better that we openly acknowledge
that fact so we can lay the problems on the table and explore all
the ramifications and affix a realistic price tag to the merchandise?

Comments, Casenotes
and
Statute Notes

